Abstract
Introduction
Secure cooperation is the problem of protecting mutually suspicious code units from one another while they are executing in the same run-time environment [22, 27] . It finds applications in dynamically extensible software systems such as mobile code platforms, scriptable applications, and software systems with plug-in architectures. The language-based approach to security [26] is an established paradigm for addressing the challenge of secure cooperation. Specifically, untrusted code units are encoded in a safe language, and subsequently executed in a secure runtime environment, the protection mechanisms of which are implemented by programming language technologies such as type systems, program rewriting, and execution monitoring. This paper proposes a language-based access control mechanism that is based solely on name visibility control.
Existing language-based approaches to access control are mostly based on the classical notion of interposition [30, 29, 32, 1] . A direct implementation of this idea is to interpose monitoring code at the entry points of system services. At run time, authorization decisions are made by examining invocation arguments or execution history. For example, stack inspection [30] as found in the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) [19] and the Common Language Infrastructure (CLI) [9] is implemented in this way. Direct interposition, however, is difficult to maintain. Security checks are scattered over the entire host system. Fixing a vulnerability requires the availability of host system source code. Worst still, as security checks are hard-coded into the host system, evolution in security requirements or software configuration is not easily addressed without reprogramming the host system itself.
A second language-based approach to implement interposition is by load-time binary rewriting [10, 29, 30, 32] Specifically, monitoring code is weaved into untrusted code at load time. Although this so called inlined reference monitor (IRM) approach [29] is equal in expressive power to direct interposition [14] , the former has clear software engineering advantages over the latter. In particular, the late binding of security checks allows security code to evolve separately from the rest of the system, thereby addressing the software engineering concerns raised in the previous paragraph. Unfortunately, independent reports have confirmed that the injected code incurs significant run-time overhead [29, 30] .
Is interposition (direct or IRM-based) always necessary for access control in the context of dynamically extensible systems?
Interposition is motivated by the need for execution monitoring [25] , in which the dynamic state and the execution history of a system are examined when authorization decisions are made. In many cases, one simply wants to completely turn off a system service. (This is evident by the large number of target-less BasicPermissions defined in the Java 2 security architecture.) In other cases, the safety property [25] to be enforced is memory-less, and the avoidance of the confused deputy problem [15] is not a significant concern. In such contexts, execution monitoring can be replaced by a lighter-weight enforcement mechanism that does not exhibit the engineering dilemma presented by interposition.
In this paper, we explore a seldom studied point in the design space of language-based access control -name visibility control. The intuition is that, if the name of the entry point for a system service is not visible to an untrusted code unit, then the service is essentially inaccessible to the code unit. Therefore, access control can be achieved by specifying what names are visible, to whom they are visible, and to what extent they are visible. The goal of this research is to investigate the degree to which name visibility control can serve the purpose of access control when full-fledged execution monitoring is not necessary. To this end, we present the design of a practical security architecture for dynamically extensible Java applications that is built around a module system called ISOMOD (Sect. 2). In programming language literature, a module system is a facility responsible for managing the visibility of names across namespaces [16] . Because ISOMOD exercises name visibility control only at load time, and does not inject any monitoring code into classfiles, loaded code runs at full speed. Furthermore, because ISOMOD access control policies are maintained separately, they evolve independently from core application code. An interesting finding of this study is that a rich family of access control policies can be expressed as name visibility constraints. The ISOMOD policy language provides a declarative means for expressing a very general form of visibility constraints (Sect. 3). Not only can the ISOMOD policy language simulate a sizable subset of permissions in the Java 2 security architecture (Sect. 4.1), it can do so with policies that are robust to changes in software configurations (Sect. 4.2). The ISOMOD policy language is also expressive enough to completely encode a capability type system known as Discretionary Capability Confinement [12] (Sect. 4). In spite of its expressiveness, the ISO-MOD policy language admits an efficient implementation strategy (Sect. 5). In short, ISOMOD avoids the technical difficulties of interposition by trading off an acceptable level 
The ISOMOD Security Architecture
ISOMOD employs name visibility control as the sole mechanism for access control. We describe the Java class loading mechanism from the perspective of name visibility control. In programming language terminology, a Java class loader is the mirror [5] of a run-time namespace. Hierarchical organization of namespaces is enabled by the delegation model of class loading [18] , in which the names visible in a parent namespace are imported implicitly into a child namespace (Fig. 1) . Consequently, the set of names visible in a namespace is the union of (1) the set of names visible in its delegation parent and (2) the set of names that are defined locally. A class may refer to external entities such as other classes and their fields and methods. These external references are resolved in the same namespace in which the referring class is defined. In short, static scoping is enforced.
In a dynamically extensible software system, the trusted application core is defined in a parent namespace, while child namespaces are created for defining untrusted software extensions (Fig. 1) . Core application services are exposed to the extension code through implicit name import from the core application namespace to the extension namespace. ISOMOD is a run-time module system designed for isolating untrusted software extensions. It does so by controlling the visibility of names in the extension namespaces. Specifically, an ISOMOD namespace enforces 2 kinds of control: (1) restricting the visibility of names that are imported from the parent namespace, and (2) restricting the visibility of locally defined names. When a name is placed under visibility control, an ISOMOD namespace may (a) control which locally defined class can "see" the name, and (b) present an alternative, restricted view of the entity to which the name is bound. Every ISOMOD namespace is endowed with a custom name visibility policy, which specifies
N creates an instance of C reflect N gets the Class object of C new-array N creates an array of C Similarly, cast-array, instanceof-array, reflect-array. . A major contribution of this work is the design of a policy language that can express a rich family of access control policies as fine-grained visibility constraints. An ISOMOD namespace is an instance of a user-defined class loader type. An ISOMOD class loader performs extra checks on a classfile before converting it into a Class object. Specifically, class definition is only authorized when no external accesses in the classfile are denied by the policy. This late enforcement of visibility control distinguishes ISOMOD from traditional module systems, in which visibility control is enforced only at compile time. It is this feature that turns the ISOMOD module system into a viable protection mechanism.
An ISOMOD namespace may be constructed at run time by an application core from an ISOMOD policy. This late binding of access control policy to code not only supports the separate maintenance of code and policy, but also supports the presentation of different views of the same application core to different extensions.
The ISOMOD Policy Language
The ISOMOD policy language provides a declarative and expressive means to specify the access control policy of an ISOMOD namespace. An access is composed of three elements: (1) a subject, (2) an object, and (3) 
Figure 3. Sample predicates
An object is also called a target to avoid confusion in the context of object oriented programming. ISOMOD controls access to three kinds of targets: (a) declared types, (b) fields, and (c) methods. A declared type is either a class or an interface. For brevity, the word "class" is used as a synonym of "declared type". Every target is identified by a name visible in the ISOMOD namespace. A target can be accessed by exercising a fixed set of access rights as outlined in Fig. 2 . A subject is either (a) a declared type whose name is defined in the ISOMOD namespace, or (b) a method declared in such a class. An ISOMOD policy is made up of a finite number of policy clauses (or access control rules), each of which has the following general syntax:
In general, a policy clause describes if a target O grants (denies) access rights r 1 , . . . , r k to a subject S. When the optional to-phrase is omitted, the rights are granted (denied) categorically. An optional condition c may also be supplied to specify when the policy clause is applicable (not applicable). The condition c is a first-order predicate in O and S. The ISOMOD policy language predefines a number of built-in connectives, predicates and functions for expressing complex applicability conditions. ISOMOD also provides a simple mechanism for policy programmers to define application-specific predicates and functions. Fig. 3 shows a sample of built-in predicates.
Prior to the definition of a declared type [19, Sect. 5.3] , its classfile is examined by the ISOMOD class loader for conformance to the corresponding ISOMOD policy. To this end, the set of all accesses in which the classfile (or one of its declared methods) is a subject is first collected. Each access is then checked according to the authorization algorithm outlined in Fig. 4 : the policy clauses are examined in the order they appear in the policy, and the authorization decision of the first applicable policy clause is then adopted. (A default authorization decision can be specified by the user of ISOMOD to handle the case when no policy clause applies.) If any access is denied by the policy, the definition of the declared type will not be authorized.
Simple as it is, the ISOMOD policy language is capable of expressing a rich family of access control policies, a topic to which we will now turn. 
Sample Applications

Selective Hiding of System Services
ISOMOD can be used to enforce many of the BasicPermissions defined in the Java 2 platform. For example, the getClassLoader permission controls whether untrusted code may acquire a ClassLoader reference from the platform library. The effects of denying this permission can be simulated by the ISOMOD policy below: policy getClassLoader default allow method ClassLoader denies { invoke } The policy begins with a header that identifies the policy name and asserts that the default authorization decision is to allow access (i.e., when no policy clause applies). Next come the policy clauses, which disallow invocation of all methods declared in the Java platform library that return a ClassLoader. Notice that one may either specify a method target solely by its name (e.g., getClassLoader), or by both its name and its type signature (e.g., forName 1 ). 1 The forName method is denied because untrusted code may pass in a null ClassLoader reference to access the bootstrap ClassLoader.
The related createClassLoader permission controls whether untrusted code may create new instances of the ClassLoader class. In the Java 2 platform, security checks are embedded in the constructors of ClassLoader, SecureClassLoader and URLClassLoader for ensuring that the caller possesses the said permission. Denying the createClassLoader permission can be simulated with the following policy clause:
Notice that this policy clause is more general than the ones aforementioned: it is applicable to any constructor M of a class C that is either ClassLoader or one of its subclasses (i.e., the predicate constructor tests if a method is a constructor, and the binary relation subclass is the reflexive transitive closure of the extends relation). Specifically, constructor invocation is denied. This rules out all means for creating ClassLoader instances.
The following is an alternative policy clause that achieves the same effects.
Rather than controlling the invocation of ClassLoader constructors, this policy clause directly disallows the creation of new ClassLoader instances. Most BasicPermissions defined in the Java 2 platform can be expressed declaratively by ISOMOD. There is, however, a clear software engineering advantage to the ISOMOD approach. Consider what is required in implementing and maintaining a Java 2 BasicPermission. One has to inspect the entire Java 2 platform library to identify all points of attack, and then interpose monitoring code at each point. When a vulnerability is found, library source code has to be modified. In the ISOMOD example above, an exhaustive audit of the platform library is still necessary, yet the maintenance path is far superior: the policy is expressed declaratively and maintained independently.
The ISOMOD approach provides a way to enforce fine-grained access control policies not expressible by the Java 2 permission system. Suppose we are to prevent untrusted code from using the Reflection API to invoke methods, access fields and arrays, and create new object instances, but we want to permit the examination of class interfaces. The existing permissions defined in Java 2 are not sufficient for expressing this highly selective policy. However, there is no problem constructing ISOMOD policy clauses to selectively hide the following reflection services: (1) method invocation: Method.invoke; (2) 
Systematic Control of Reference Acquisition
In the createClassLoader example, we could have formulated the following rule to deny the instantiation of new URLClassLoader instances:
We did not impose this policy clause because such a restriction is not part of the semantics of the createClassLoader permission. Yet, this observation reveals a general challenge in policy formulation. Suppose we want to eliminate all means by which untrusted code may acquire a ClassLoader instance (that is, either by retrieving an existing instance or by creating a new one). An exhaustive audit of the platform library must be conducted to ensure all means of leaking ClassLoader references are accounted for. Not only is this an error-prone approach, it does not account for many useful configuration management practices: What if non-standard platform extension libraries are installed? What if ISOMOD is used for isolating dynamically downloaded plug-ins of an extensible application? Platform extensions and application classes may expose additional means of leaking ClassLoader references. To ensure that the access control policy is bullet proof, even a minor perturbation of the software configuration will necessitate a reaudit of the software infrastructure. Such a practice is simply unacceptable. A major contribution of ISOMOD is that it offers an expressive and declarative policy language that addresses the aforementioned configuration management challenge in access control. We demonstrate this feature by producing an ISOMOD policy that systematically restricts the acquisition of ClassLoader references. To this end, we begin by exhaustively enumerating all means by which a reference of type A may acquire a reference of type C: 
Discretionary Capability Confinement
We demonstrate how ISOMOD can be used for enforcing a general-purpose capability type system, Discretionary Capability Confinement (DCC) [12] . A lightweight, statically enforceable type system, DCC supports the use of abstractly-typed object references as capabilities in a Javalike object-oriented programming language. A capability [8] is an object reference qualified by a set of access rights, the latter specifying in what ways the underlying object can 
Figure 5. DCC Type Constraints
be accessed through the reference. Capabilities can be modeled in a language-based environment through a capability type system, in which every object reference is statically assigned a capability type that restricts access to the underlying object. In a sense, a capability type presents a restricted view of the object it types. In a Java-like object-oriented programming language, an object reference with a static interface type (or abstract class type) could be seen as a capability, because the typed reference only exposes a restricted view of the underlying object. This approach of modeling capabilities suffers from two problems: capability leakage and capability theft [28] . DCC is a minimal perturbation to Java for controlling capability propagation. In the following, we illustrate the expressiveness of ISOMOD by employing its policy language to encode the DCC type system. The focus here is ISOMOD and not DCC. Interested readers may consult [12] for more details of DCC. In DCC, the space of declared types (e.g., class & interface) is partitioned into a finite number of confinement domains, so that every declared type belongs to exactly one confinement domain. We write l(C) = D when declared type C belongs to confinement domain D. The confinement domains are partially ordered by a dominance relation . We say that domain D dominates domain E when E D. Together, domain membership and dominance induce a natural pre-ordering of declared types: if l(B) = E, l(A) = D, and E D, then we write B A, and say that B trusts A. The intuition behind these definitions is that, if C trusts A, then A may freely acquire a reference of static type C. Otherwise, C is said to be a capability for A. Capability acquisition is carefully restricted in DCC. We also write A B when A B and B A hold simultaneously. We postulate that there is a root domain which is dominated by every domain.
To control capability granting, associated with every method m is a domain l(m), called the capability granting policy of m. Intuitively, the capability granting policy l(m) dictates what capabilities may be granted by m, and to which declared types m may grant a capability. (We write  m n, m A and A m for the obvious meaning.) A second partial ordering : on domains is postulated. We say that D strongly dominates E when E : D. As we shall see, strong dominance controls whether subtyping is allowed across domain boundaries. This helps to establish mutually exclusive roles. Fig. 5 enumerates the type constraints of DCC as specified in [12] . We have successfully encoded all the DCC type constraints by an ISOMOD policy, which is displayed in Appendix A. Behind the policy of Appendix A is a number of assumptions. As in [12] , we assume that domain membership and capability granting policies are embedded in Java classfiles via the JDK 1.5 metadata facility. Domains are represented by specially annotated interfaces, and the dominance and strongly dominance relations are encoded respectively by the subinterfacing relation and JDK 1.5 annotations. Domain-specific functions and predicates have been defined to examine these annotations. In the following we will highlight some aspects of this encoding that illustrate further features of ISOMOD.
Consider the following type constraint from In this constraint, the first clause denies the generation of capabilities, and the second clause denies the sharing of capabilities with reference types belonging to a different confinement domain. This constraint can be encoded as the following ISOMOD policy clauses: Two additional features of ISOMOD are demonstrated in the above policy clauses. Firstly, ISOMOD provides a syntax (i.e., to) for qualifying to which subject a policy clause applies. As capability acquisition is permitted for some subjects but not others, this discrimination enables fine-grained access control. Secondly, ISOMOD supports user-defined predicates and functions for modeling domain-specific relations. For example, trusts is a user-defined predicate for representing the binary trust relation between declared types. Let us consider a second type constraint from Fig. 5 : The lazy preloading strategy breaks circularity, and correctly attributes policy violations to the offending classfiles. The preloading algorithm is detailed in Fig. 6 . This design is informed by previous work on modular bytecode verification in the presence of lazy, dynamic linking [13, 11] .
Performance Evaluation. We conducted experiments to profile the performance of our implementation strategy. We measured the running time of 6 open source Java applications under 5 configurations on a stock PC (P4 3GHz). The first configuration, Control, is to run an application in a bare JVM. In the other four configurations, the applications are loaded by an ISOMOD class loader. These configurations differ in the ISOMOD policy being imposed. The NULL configuration imposes an empty policy that allows all accesses. The AllowAll configuration imposes a policy with policy clauses that match and allow every access. The JAC and DCC configurations impose the ISOMOD encoding of Java's access control mechanism and DCC respectively (see Sect. 4.3). Five trials were repeated for each configuration to account for variability, and the average running time (in seconds) is reported in Fig. 7 . A number of observations can be made of Fig. 7 . Firstly, the overhead of ISOMOD for a given application is the difference in running time between an ISOMOD configuration and the Control configuration. Notice that this overhead never exceeds 3.5 seconds in our experiments. This confirms that the technology is feasible for practical applications. Secondly, the difference in running time between the NULL and Control configurations roughly provides an estimate of the overhead contributed by the maintenance of type mirrors. The rest of the overhead can be attributed to policy evaluation. Thirdly, the overhead contributed by ISOMOD does not grow with the total running time of an application. This can be explained by noticing that ISOMOD only incurs overhead at the time of application start-up. For a long-running application (e.g., SableCC), the overhead will be amortized away.
Concluding Remarks
Limitations Enforcement mechanisms that are based solely on static analysis, of which ISOMOD is an example, are provably less powerful than those that employ execution monitoring [14] . For example, policies in which authorization decision is a function of invocation arguments or execution history are not enforceable by ISOMOD. Our goal is not to match the expressiveness of execution monitoring, but rather to find a lightweight alternative to interposition when full-fledged execution monitoring is not necessary.
Related Work
As surveyed in Sect. 1, languagebased software isolation has been achieved mostly by interposition-based mechanisms in the past. Early language-based systems such as Scheme 48 [22] , Safe-Tcl [21] and SPIN [4] adopt namespace management as a primary protection mechanism. Two component mechanisms are involved. Firstly, dynamic linking dispatches monitoring code when system services are invoked. This is simply another form of interposition. A Java incarnation of linking-based interposition is described in [31] . Secondly, rudimentary name visibility control is employed to hide certain names in a namespace. None of the policy clauses in Sect. 4.2 and 4.3 can be enforced in this manner. We have thus demonstrated that name visibility control can in fact be much more expressive than conventional belief.
The study of module systems has a long history [16] . We highlight some recent developments on the Java front. JavaMod [2] is a module system for Java-like languages. The interaction between modularity and subtyping is carefully articulated. Bauer et al [3] extend the Java package facility to obtain a module system that supports the decoration of import statements with linking obligations, which are in turn implemented as digital signatures. MJ [7] is a module system designed to control the complexity of configuration management in Java platforms. Liu and Smith [20] describe a module system that supports the declaration of bi-directional interfaces. Designed primarily for access control, ISOMOD is unique in two ways: (1) name visibility constraints can be imposed dynamically; (2) fine-grained name visibility constraints can be expressed in the ISOMOD policy language to control not only what names are visible, but also to whom and to what extent they are visible.
This work has been informed by the recent work in encapsulation policies [24, 23] . Specifically, the designer of a class A associates to A a fixed number of access control policies, each presenting a different view of A. A client class B then selects a policy through which B interacts with A. Three points of comparison are worth noting. Firstly, because the client decides which policy to adopt, the scheme cannot be used for protection. Secondly, policies are formulated on a per-class basis, the universally quantified access control rules described in Sect. 4 cannot be expressed. Thirdly, ISOMOD defines a wider collection of access rights, thereby differentiating finer levels of visibility.
Future Work
We are interested in extending ISOMOD into a full-fledged authorization system in the style of JAAS. Another direction is to study ISOMOD policy refinement and composition. We are also interested in employing ISOMOD to enforce communication integrity.
